AN ANALYSIS OF A HYPOTHETICAL COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC SECTOR PLANNING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO EXPECTED RESISTANCE TO PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

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AN ANALYSIS OF A HYPOTHETICAL COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC SECTOR PLANNING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO EXPECTED RESISTANCE TO PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Approved:

Paul S. Jones, Chairman

Gunter P. Sharp

Clayden Thompson

Date approved by Chairman: 1/23/76

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> ...the test of any plan lies in its ability to sustain affirmative decisions by all the decision centers which can establish or affect its enforcement...a plan which cannot meet the test of legal and political feasibility is little more than a pretense, a proclamation, or an editorial comment [37].

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SUMMARY

Governmental agencies responsible for the implementation of planned governmental actions are finding it increasingly difficult to implement these actions due to active citizen resistance. Citizen resistance can block implementation, wasting valuable planning resources that have been invested including time, money, and manpower. More importantly, the situations which initially provoked the planning efforts may deteriorate during the elapsed time between the planning decision and the implementation action. This research examined and tested a "total systems approach" to comprehensive public sector planning or CPS. The methodology used in the research was to (1) synthesize a possible configuration of the desired planning system which was amenable to analysis, (2) develop a set of criteria with which the effectiveness of the CPS in solving the problem could be judged, (3) analyze the CPS using the developed criteria, and (4) examine an actual planning situation to establish an initial degree of validity for the set of criteria and, thus, for the analysis. Conclusions reached in the research include:

1. The resistance to a plan by an organized group is expected to occur as a direct function of two factors:

a. The discrepancies that exist between the possible

consequences of the proposed plan and the common goal set of the group.

b. An absence of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed plan which relate to important elements of the group's common goal set.

2. The resistance to a plan by the general public is a direct function of two factors very similar to those in (1) above.

3. The probability of effective plan resistance from an organized group is much greater than that from the general public.

4. The CPS has the potential to support development of a plan which will encounter only minimal resistance from organized groups and the general public. The actual results are heavily dependent upon the participants in the CPS: the citizens, the elected decision maker, and the planner.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

To paraphrase Mathewson [37]: citizens have a degree of control over the actions of government, and proposed governmental actions or plans which do not recognize this fact are subject to resistance at implementation. The histories of current freeway construction efforts, current water management efforts, and, on a much larger scale, the Vietnam War effort validate Mathewson's observation explicitly. Besides validating this fact of governmental life, these same histories also suggest the existence of a problem, an increasing inability of government to implement planned actions. More specifically, the last decade has witnessed an increasing trend in citizen resistance to the implementation of planned governmental actions. The practical result of this trend has been an increasing delay between planning decisions and implementation actions, with an ever-increasing number of plans being frustrated completely. Coupled with this result is the seeming waste of valuable planning resources--time, money, and manpower--in planning actions which are not implementable. Possibly of greater concern, is the fact

that the situations which initially provoked the planning efforts may deteriorate in the interim period between decision and action. A review of the literature is instructive in determining the causes of the problem, hypothetical solutions to the problem, and reasons why these approaches have not proved successful in the past.

Literature Search

The literature of both public administration and public-sector planning give credence to the existence of the problem. Fabos attributes the major problem in public-sector planning to a lack of acceptance by the general public [18]. Meyer takes a stronger stand and states that governmental action is severely threatened and that the process is being unduly restricted or even immobilized [42]. While the institutional literature has only recently become concerned with the problem, citizen activist literature has dealt with it for many years. Written on ghetto walls, distributed in leaflets, or carried on signs, slogans such as "We Shall Overcome" and "Hell No, We Won't Go" indicate its pervasive presence.

The problem has been attributed to a variety of factors, but most fall into one of two broad categories. The first is that government is finding plan legitimation more and more difficult. According to Webster, plan legitimation is "the process of affirming a plan to be

justified" [55]. Rogers and Shoemaker describe plan legitimation as "a process by which a plan is approved or sanctioned by those who informally represent the social system in its norms and values and in the social power they possess" [47].

Difficulties in plan legitimation appear to be two-fold. The first difficulty is that past governmental action has given the citizen good reason to question future governmental action, thus helping to justify opposition [33,51]. This difficulty is reiterated by the Area Wide Council, a citizen participation group which formed to aid in planning the Model Cities Program in Philadelphia:

> It might be beautiful if City Hall and HUD were trustworthy. But our History testifies to the fact that we'd be fools to trust the politicians. We were cheated each time we let our legal guard down. We only succeeded when we insisted that the politicians live up to their promises, and when we demonstrated that we had some power [4].

The second difficulty in plan legitimation is that of basic inadequacies in goal formulation and utilization in the traditional public sector planning process. Wachs and Schofer state that public unrest at implementation is at least partly due to the adoption of trivial goal sets early in the planning process [54]. Levin and Abend attributed many transportation-related implementation problems to an absence of goals and priorities at the local, state, and federal levels [32]. A Transportation Research

Board Symposium on issues in statewide transportation planning suggested that plans were contested because there were more goals to consider than could possibly be utilized in the aggregative benefit-cost economic analysis that is an integral part of traditional public-sector planning [51]. Fried cites the relationship between population desires and expectations and the values of the planning expert as a critical problem [20]. Altshuler concludes that although Americans still have many of the same tastes, they would now like to be able to make their own decisions [2].

The second category of factors concerns the ability of the citizen to channel dissent into effective delay and even stoppage of governmental action through institutional means once a plan has been perceived to be unjustified. Local government has increased power to veto higher level plans [51]. Procedural rules for allowing parties to represent the public interest in courts have been liberalized [28]. Laws establishing minimum information requirements as a prerequisite for certain types of governmental action were passed, including the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, the Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. When coupled with the Freedom of Information Act of 1970, these acts provide meaningful information to the citizen with which he may contest planned governmental actions.

Suggested solutions to the implementation resistance

problem attempt to address the basic categories of problem causes. Although no source in the literature openly advocates reducing institutional citizen power to resist governmental action, it is at least implied by Meyer [42]. A more popular approach to solving the legitimation aspect of the problem is to allow citizen participation in the planning process. A Highway Research Board Symposium on citizen participation found that citizen participation lends a sense of legitimacy to the planning process. One member even suggested that implementation is possible only with citizen participation [28]. Bolan explores various strategies or procedures to determine how, when, and to what depth various parties can participate in the planning process [12].

Another widely advocated approach concerns modification of some of the more traditional aspects of goal setting and use in the planning process. Most planners agree that a goal set used in public sector planning should be comprehensive rather than functional [3,18,50,54]. They also agree that this goal set should be founded primarily on the values and beliefs of the citizens rather than upon those of the planner [3,53]. A growing number of planners suggest the idea that alternative generation, forecasting, and evaluation techniques used in the planning process should be based exclusively on goals. Techniques cited include plan rating schemes [35], cost-effectiveness

analysis [50], and the government's PPB program [20]. Such techniques imply that goal sets are unbiased with respect to possible alternatives and are operational, stated explicitly in terms of measurable criteria [35,50,53].

A somewhat more radical approach to the problem is suggested by Mertins [38]. While referring specifically to transportation planning, his argument may be extended to public sector planning in general. He advocates a complete restructuring of the present piecemeal planning process around a total systems approach. The resulting system would offer continuous goal seeking and planning functions based upon a solid citizen-perception and empirical data base with a macro-system orientation. The system would serve as a single planning entity encompassing all of what is now many uncoordinated functional elements. Thomas and Schofer constructed a hypothetical system model, again in the transportation planning context, that conforms to Mertin's total system approach specification [50].

While these possible solutions may be theoretically sound, their application to real world planning situations have not, in general, proved successful. Firstly, there is serious doubt as to whether the American citizen would ever allow his newly regained institutional influence over governmental action to be diminished. Secondly, citizen participation as practiced has proven to be more of a cosmetic panacea than a real citizen input into governmental

decision-making. Austin found that Community Action Agencies, citizen participation groups formed under the auspices of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, had very little impact on proposed governmental actions [6]. In a similar study, Hallman found that as the agencies became stronger and better organized, government tended to restrict their actions [25]. Arnstein reports a similar restriction on the actions of the Area Wide Council of Philadelphia [4]. Aleshire attributes this type of governmental reaction to the bureaucratic power structure attempting to maintain its decision-making power [1]. Wachs reports that although citizen participation has been measured, it has seldom been incorporated into the planning process [53].

Thirdly, Altshuler has found that truly comprehensive goals tend to be too general to provide a basis for evaluating concrete alternatives [3]. Wachs has determined that public opinion polls do not meet goal formulation needs and has hypothesized that the average person has difficulty conceptualizing his goals [53]. Without these goals, goal directed evaluation methods are useless.

Finally, Mertins realizes that certain technical and social problems must be solved before the total systems approach can be applied [38]. Technical problems include a lack of understanding of certain causal relationships necessary to the system model, inadequate data, and a lack of technical understanding of citizen goals. Social

problems include traditions such as aggregative benefit-cost analysis and apple-pie and flag goals that have ensnared the public sector planning process.

Proposed Research

Purpose

This research thoroughly examines and tests one of the existing hypothetical approaches to the implementation resistance problem to determine its potential effectiveness in problem solving. In particular, this research analyzes an extension of the hypothetical "total systems approach" to transportation planning suggested by Mertins and modeled by Thomas and Schofer and estimates the resistance to implementation of a plan proposed by the system.

The importance of examining such a hypothetical approach to the problem of implementation resistance stems from two factors. First, as noted previously, the increasing trend of active citizen resistance to the implementation of planned governmental actions is a significant problem. Thus, any significant approach to solving the problem is worthy of such an analysis. Second, an extension of the hypothetical "total systems approach" to planning is such a significant approach. It is rational, comprehensive, continuous, systematic, and objective in the sense of explicitness. More importantly, the existing deficiencies identified by Mertins which currently make use of a "total

systems approach" infeasible appear to be solvable in the short term.

Procedure. A meaningful system analysis presupposes the existence of two critical components. First, there must be an actual system or model of the system. Second, there must be relevant criteria by which system performance can be measured. Chapter II is devoted to developing a hypothetical "total systems approach" to comprehensive public sector planning (CPS). The model of this system is synthesized from the Thomas and Schofer model and various portions of the comprehensive planning literature. Chapter III is devoted to developing a set of relevant criteria which relates the output of a public sector planning system to the expected resistance to plan implementation. After making an important assumption concerning the relationship between legitimation difficulty and resistance to implementation, Chapter III formulates a legitimation system model and from this model develops the necessary set of criteria.

The actual analysis of the CPS is performed in Chapter IV. The analysis is necessarily conceptual in nature since both the CPS developed in Chapter II and the criteria developed in Chapter III are conceptual. For this reason, analytical arguments leading to conclusions are deductive and follow logically from previous knowledge. Although the conceptual nature of models, criteria, and analysis are not conducive to absolute validation, it is

possible to establish an initial degree of validity through the use of an example. In Chapter V, a rejected plan to construct a 1.08 mile segment of the proposed Stone Mountain Freeway in Atlanta, Georgia, is examined to determine the reasonableness of the criteria developed in Chapter III. The process by which this plan was conceived is then described historically and analyzed to determine what particular aspects of the process led to the plan's rejection. Chapter VI then concludes this research by drawing relevant conclusions and recommending future research directions.

CHAPTER II

THE "TOTAL SYSTEM APPROACH" TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC SECTOR PLANNING SYSTEM

The purpose of Chapter II is to present a logical extension of the "total systems approach" transportation planning system suggested by Mertins and modelled by Thomas and Schofer. Called the "total systems approach" comprehensive public sector planning system or CPS, the extension seeks to correct several aspects of the Thomas and Schofer model which make it unsatisfactory for direct use in this research. As implied by its title, the Thomas and Schofer model is functional to transportation planning. The desired extension includes all functional areas of planning. Furthermore, the Thomas and Schofer model is not presented in sufficient detail to allow a substantive analysis. Thus, the CPS "fills the gaps" of the Thomas and Schofer model.

Key Elements of the CPS

According to Davidoff and Reiner, a public sector planning system, henceforth referred to as a planning system, model must include three key elements: the environment of the planning system, the purpose of the planning system, and the set of functions which comprise the planning system [17]. Willeke suggests a fourth key element, that of the

participants in the planning system and their inter-relationships [57]. Defining the CPS as the determinant of all proposed governmental actions or plans, one may equate the CPS with government itself. The environment of the CPS can then be equated with the environment of government, which might be functionally defined as any aspect of the environmental whole which can affect and/or can be affected by government. The relationship of the CPS with its environment can then be represented conceptually as shown in Figure 1 below. In Figure 1, the arc from the environment to the CPS represents all forces which the environment exerts upon government. These forces may be physical or informational flows. Likewise, the return arc represents all forces which government exerts upon the environment. These forces may be physical, though the implementation of planned physical governmental actions, or indirect, through the adherence to planned governmental policy directives. For the purposes of this research, both proposed physical actions and proposed policy directives are considered plans.

It should be noted from the structure of the relationships in Figure 1 that the CPS has the potential of acting as an environmental controller via a feedback control loop. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the CPS: to control the environment in a manner which effectively meets the desires of its citizens.



Figure 1. Relationship Between a Planning System and its Environment

Viewing the CPS as a rational environmental controller and utilizing the basic concepts of elementary systems theory, one can conclude that the CPS must have certain characteristics. First, the CPS must be able to determine or estimate the values of the environmental state variables at various points in time. Second, the CPS must be able to determine or estimate the desired values of these state variables at these points in time. Third, the CPS must be able to determine or estimate what forces it can feasibly exert on the environment so as to drive the environmental state variable towards their desired values. The functions which comprise the CPS represent necessary components of these characteristics. The functions and their structure are depicted in the block diagram shown in Figure 2 below. These functions and their structure are very similar to the model proposed by Thomas and Schofer. In fact, it was Thomas and Schofer's use of similar characteristics in developing their model that inspired its "total systems approach" title.

The particular design of the CPS block diagram is significant for several reasons. First, the radial layout coupled with the central placement of the function of determining the desires of the governed clearly emphasizes the distinct purpose of the CPS. Second, the inclusion of the environment emphasizes the controller-controlled relationship between the CPS and the environment. Third,



Figure 2. The Block Diagram of the CPS

the continuity of the design emphasizes that the process of control is continuous and on-going. Fourth, and most important, the diagram gives the CPS an explicit structure which is a necessity for system analysis.

Rather than provide a separate discussion of the participants in the CPS, the research integrates the discussion of participants and their roles into that of the functions comprising the CPS. At the single unit planning-governmental level these participants might be the citizens, the elected decision maker, and the planner. As suggested earlier, the basic functions comprising the CPS and much of their structure are borrowed from the Thomas and Schofer model [50]. The actual content of each function, including its participants, is this author's, except where specifically noted.

Detailed Functioning of the CPS

A more detailed description of the functions which comprise the CPS must necessarily begin with that of determining the desires of the governed. The desires of the governed are stated explicitly as a set of objectives [17,18,50,54,59]. Each objective is a specific, preferred physical characteristic of the environment stated in terms of a criterion, a specific measure or test [53]. The criterion may be empirical and completely objective, non-empirical and completely subjective, or somewhere between the two extremes [50,53]. An objective does not necessarily

reflect a current problem. Instead, it represents any physical characteristic of the environment that the governed hold as important. Thus, the set of objectives and, therefore, the desires of the governed are comprehensive [3,18, 50,54]. In addition, each objective is, as much as possible, unbiased as to the means of meeting the objective [31,50,54]. Associated with each objective is the importance that the governed give to that objective. Importance is stated in terms of what subsets of the governed support the objective and how intensively this support is given [17]. The planner is responsible for determining and maintaining a current set of objectives and their importance. This is accomplished by actively, openly and continuously soliciting objectives from the various subsets of the governed [9,17,50,53]. This requires that the planner identify all possible subsets of the governed, educate each subset as to the purpose and functional form of objectives, and solicit objectives from each subset. These subsets include organized groups, residents of geographical regions, socio-economic classes, and cultural groups, etc. [33,42,56]. It should be noted that subsets typically overlap and also as a group fail to cover the entire body of the governed. The planner also disseminates all current information concerning the set of objectives and their importance to all subsets of the governed and to the elected decision maker. The subsets of the governed are responsible for making their most current

objectives known to the planner. The set of physical characteristics associated with the set of objectives which represent the desires of the governed at a particular point in time function as the set of state variables of the environment at that time. Then, the objectives serve as the desired values of the state variables.

In the function of environmental monitoring, the planner maintains estimates of the actual values of current environmental state variables. He measures the physical characteristics of the environment which are specified in the current set of objectives in terms of the criteria which are also set forth [33]. The planner also monitors certain other specific characteristics of the environment for purposes of evaluating current implementation efforts [14]. In addition, the planner continuously disseminates all current information concerning the results of monitoring efforts to the subsets of the governed and to the elected official. Whenever criteria are non-objective and opinion analysis becomes necessary, the subsets of the governed are responsible for voicing their subjective opinions for state variable value estimation.

In the problem identification function, the planner maintains estimates of the deviations of the actual values of the environmental state variables from their desired values. Again, whenever criteria are non-objective, the subsets of the governed are responsible for helping to

estimate the extent of the deviation. The planner develops a wide variety of possible governmental actions which address some or all of the problems discovered in the current problem set [29]. The deviation of the state variable from its desired value and the importance ascribed to the corresponding objective are rough indicators of the seriousness of a particular problem. Alternative development time and resources are allocated on the basis of these indicators. The planner is also responsible for disseminating all current information concerning proposed alternatives to the subsets of the governed and to the elected official. Whenever problems exist with state variables having non-objective criteria, subsets of the governed are responsible for aiding the planner in developing alternatives. The subsets of the governed are also responsible for suggesting additional alternatives whenever they perceive that the current alternative set is inadequate. The final set of alternative governmental actions consists of all alternatives developed by the planner, all extra alternatives presented by subsets of the governed, and the null or do-nothing alternatives [50].

In the function of forecasting the consequences of alternative governmental actions, the planner estimates the expected change over time in the values of the current state variables resulting from implementation of each alternative in the current set of alternative governmental actions.

This forecasting function is facilitated through the use of environmental models. The environmental models are forecasting models which are constructed and updated by the planner utilizing data from the environment, data concerning governmental actions which are in the process of implementation, and data concerning the desires of the governed [50]. The planner continuously disseminates all current information concerning the results of forecasting efforts and status of environmental models to the subsets of the governed and to the elected official. When criteria of the state variables are non-objective, subsets of the governed are responsible for helping to forecast the performance patterns of the state variables.

In the function of evaluating alternative governmental actions, the planner makes sure that all information concerning current objectives, current deviations of the environment from the objectives, possible alternatives, and the forecasted consequences of each alternative in terms of the environmental state variables are disseminated to each subset of the governed and to the elected official [29,51]. The subsets of the governed review the forecasted consequences of the alternative plans of governemntal action in terms of the current set of objectives and communicate their opinions to the elected official. These opinions may be support for a particular alternative, support for a particular alternative with modifications, or lack of support

for any alternative. The opinions should include explicit reasons for their support. From the opinions of the governed and the information compiled by the CPS, the elected official makes the decision as to whether to implement a particular plan of action, or to direct the planner to modify and reevaluate certain alternatives.

CHAPTER III

CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT

General Aspects of Criteria Development

The purpose of Chapter III is to develop a set of criteria which relate the output of a planning system, a plan, to the expected resistance to that plan's implementation. Returning to the literature search of Chapter I, one can conclude that resistance to a plan's implementation is the result of two processes acting sequentially. In the first process, which might be termed the legitimation process, the governed either have no difficulty in legitimating the plan, they perceive the plan to be justified, or they experience difficulty in legitimating the plan, they do not perceive the plan to be justified. If sufficient legitimation difficulty occurs in the legitimation process, the second process, which might be termed the influence process, may be utilized by the governed to channel dissent into actual resistance to the plan's implementation. A conceptual block diagram of these processes is shown in Figure 3 below.

From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that the set of criteria relating a plan to expected resistance at implementation must explain the functioning



Figure 3. Diagram of the Implementation Resistance Process

of the legitimation and influence processes. However, this task can be greatly simplified through the use of an assumption; whenever significant difficulty is encountered in legitimating a plan, that plan will encounter resistance to its being implemented. Using such an assumption, the criteria need only relate the plan to the expected difficulty in plan legitimation, with resistance to implementation directly following. There are several practical implications of this assumption. First, upon perceiving a plan to be unjustified, the governed will be motivated or predisposed to take action to resist the plan's implementation. Second, there will always be channels of influence available in the influence process through which motivation can be transformed into implementation resistance.

While these practical implications may not always hold in practical situations, there are several strong reasons for its use. First, it will later be concluded that the primary participants in the legitimation process are organized groups who have established themselves over time. It will also be shown that there is research evidence [7,11,27,45] to indicate that such groups will be motivated to resist the implementation of a proposed action once they perceive it as unjustified. Second, although it may not always be true that an effective, readily available channel of influence exists through which motiviation can be transformed into implementation resistance, the literature search

[28,51] has shown that these channels of influence are expanding, and there is every likelihood that the availability of these channels will, in time, approach the ideal implicit in the assumption.

Development of an Individual Legitimation Process Model

Having made the simplifying assumption that implementation resistance follows directly from legitimation difficulty, one can develop the necessary set of criteria directly from a model of the legitimation process. Since the output of the legitimation has been assumed to be a motivation or predisposition towards behavior, a sound model of the internal mechanism of the process must be founded upon behavioral theory. Initially assuming that the legitimator is an individual, one may conclude from Freudian psychology, Hullian stimulus-response theory, Lewin's field theory, and social learning theory that the individual's behavior is motivated towards the achievement of his goals [46]. While the process may be modelled in accordance with the propositions of each of the behavioral theories, Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is particularly amenable to modelling.

Festinger describes cognitive dissonance as a perceived discrepancy among an individual's cognitive elements. Cognitive elements are knowledges or beliefs about oneself or one's environment. Festinger further defines consonance

as an absence of dissonance [19]. Zajonc offers nine propositions of cognitive dissonance theory:

1. Cognitive dissonance is a noxious state.

2. In the case of cognitive dissonance, the individual attempts to reduce or eliminate it, and he acts so as to avoid events that will increase it.

3. In the case of consonance the individual acts so as to avoid dissonance-producing events.

4. The severity or the intensity of cognitive dissonance varies with:

   a. the importance of the cognition involved

   b. the relative number of cognitions standing in dissonant relation to one another

5. The strength of the tendencies enumerated in (2) and (3) is a direct function of the severity of the dissonance.

6. Cognitive dissonance can be reduced or eliminated only by:

   a. adding new cognitions

   b. changing existing ones.

7. Adding new cognitions reduces dissonance if:

   a. The new cognition adds weight to one side and thus decreases the proportion of cognitive elements which are dissonant

   b. the new cognitions change the importance of the cognitive elements that are in dissonant relations with one another.

8. Changing existing cognitions reduces dissonance if:

   a. their new content makes them less contradictory with others

   b. their importance is reduced.

9. If new cognitions cannot be added or existing ones changed by means of a passive process, behaviors which have cognitive consequences forming consonance will be recruited. Seeking new information is an example of such behavior [60].

There are two sets of cognitive elements relevant to the individual plan legitimation model. The first is the individual's goals, ideals, beliefs, or attitudes. The second is the individual's information pertaining to the proposed governmental actions, the input into the plan legitimation process.

The cognitive dissonance theory can be restated in terms of the legitimation elements to form an individual plan legitimation model. Information concerning a proposed governmental action is input into the legitimator, where it is stored in the form of a cognitive information set. This set consists of elements which include the existence of the proposed action and its possible consequences. Also internal to the legitimator is a cognitive goal set consisting of elements which include the legitimator's goals, ideals, beliefs, and attitudes. If the legitimator perceives a discrepancy between an element of his cognitive information set and his cognitive goal set, a state of dissonance is said to exist in the legitimator. The severity or intensity of the dissonance is directly related to the number of elements that he perceives as discrepant and the importance that he places on each discrepancy. Whenever dissonance

exists in the legitimator, he is motivated to reduce it. This motivation is a direct function of the severity of the dissonance. Motivation manifests itself in several forms. Most importantly, the legitimator may try to influence the proposed actions in order to change certain elements in the cognitive information set or, possibly, even to eliminate the set altogether. If he is unable to reduce the dissonance in this manner, the legitimator may attempt to search for more positive consequences of the proposed action, or, finally, to reduce the importance that he ascribes to a particular discrepancy. These last two alternatives are less than desirable and are only utilized when it is not possible to influence the proposed action.

Development of a Group Legitimation Process Model

While the concept of the individual as a legitimator allows a fundamental initial "feel" for the legitimation process, political scientists and sociologists have long recognized that the individual, no matter how motivated, is not capable of significantly influencing governmental action. So just who are the legitimators? Mathewson states that any decision center which can establish or affect a plan's enforcement can be considered a legitimator [37]. Wengert observes that for all practical purposes, groups are the dominant legitimators [56]. Latham finds that American writers on politics have increasingly accepted the group as

the basic political form [30]. Bentley suggests that the individual's influence is a fiction [8].

Since there may be more than one conception of a group, it is necessary to define what is meant by a legitimating group. Olson finds that in the group theory literature, group means "a number of individuals with a common interest" [45]. Bentley, a proponent of this definition, states that common interests always results in group action [8]. Olson opposes such a broad definition of a legitimating group on the basis that not every "number of people with a common interest" functions as a legitimator. He contends that only organized groups work for their common interest; large, unorganized groups do not [45]. Truman supports Bently by observing that pressure groups form when necessary and argues that this phenomena represents the organization of previously large, unorganized, potential legitimating groups [52]. While two differing views are given, their consistencies are more important than their inconsistencies. First, Truman and Olson both recognize the fact that a legitimating group must not simply have a common interest, it must be organized in support of the common interest. Second, the large, unorganized groups of society cannot be ignored with respect to the legitimation process. They have organized before and will organize again. Thus, a model of the legitimation system must recognize two types of legitimators: those previously

organized legitimating groups and those unorganized, potential legitimating groups. It must include the mechanism of group motivation for each type of group and relationships between the two types of groups.

First, consider the mechanism whereby an unorganized, potential legitimating group evolves into an organized legitimating group and is motivated to influence a proposed action. A potential legitimating group is essentially a number of individuals who have the common interest of desiring to similarly influence a proposed action. Thus, each individual may be considered to be motivated, and dissonance theory can be applied to each individual in the group. As Olson argued, it is not enough to be similarly motivated. Successful influence depends upon organized group action. It could be expected that if personal influence was the only alternative recognized by the individual, he would be destined to failure and would finally either change the importance of his goals or gain solace from the fact that the proposed action has its good points. Legitimating group formation is highly dependent upon the individuals involved recognizing that influence must stem from group action. Olson has presented an economic argument that suggests that an individual will still not join and participate in the group's activities unless he is convinced that his participation is essential to the group's, and his, success in gaining the common interest [45]. Therefore,

group formation is a function of three factors: individual motivations, recognition of individual inabilities and group possibilities, and belief in individual indispensability to group success. Thus, the formation of a legitimating group is synonymous with that group's motivation to influence a proposed action. This is particularly true because of the difficulties incurred in the formation process due to presence of the latter two factors.

It should be reemphasized that the group's common interest is the individual's similar desire to influence a proposed action. This fact leads to a very interesting characteristic of newly-formed legitimating groups: the individuals in a newly-formed legitimating group need not have similar cognitive sets. This follows directly from the fact that motivation to influence is the common interest of the group and that this motivation may be caused by any of a variety of possible discrepancies between the cognitive goal set and the cognitive information set. While dissimilar sets of both types are possible, Blau and Scott suggest that differences in cognitive information sets are the less likely because of social interactions within the group [11]. Furthermore, it appears that different cognitive goal sets need not adversely affect the groups performance, as Bither finds that groups composed of individuals with heterogeneous need patterns are no less successful in complex problem solving than those with homogeneous patterns [10].

This characteristic of newly-formed legitimating groups, the possibility of its members having dissimilar cognitive goal sets, has significant implications concerning the group's future dynamic behavior. Consider a newly-formed legitimating group whose members have significantly different cognitive goal sets. While prior information suggests that initial group legitimating success is possible, it also poses serious questions as to the future of the legitimating group. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that as the initial issue dissipates, dissonance and motivation dissipate. It can be argued that this is not a permanent effect, since new governmental actions are proposed each day and are subject to the same legitimation process. However, dissonance theory also suggests that individuals with dissimilar cognitive goal sets will not consistently be motivated to similarly influence proposed actions given similar cognitive information sets. This implies that the cohesive common interest of the group, the similar motivation of the individual members, will inevitably be lost. This, in turn, implies that the newly-formed legitimating group, whose members have significantly dissimilar interests, will eventually wither and die.

In contrast, consider a group whose members have substantially similar cognitive goal sets. Given that social interaction also results in similar cognitive information sets, it directly follows that the group will

maintain its common interest and remain a participant in the legitimation process.

Consistent with this argument, an important assumption concerning the cognitive sets of the membership of long-term legitimating groups can be made: that their cognitive goal and information sets are substantially similar. Knowing this, it is relatively simple to postulate the mechanism whereby a long-term legitimating group is motivated. First, information concerning the proposed action is input into the individual group members. Social interaction within the group results in the information being homogenized and placed in each member's cognitive information set. Maier states that this group cognitive information set offers advantages of breadth of experience and varied knowledge [36]. This cognitive information set may contain elements which are discrepant with those in individual members' cognitive goal sets. If this is the case and the members have similar cognitive goal sets, the majority of the members will perceive the same discrepancies and be similarly motivated to reduce the dissonance by influencing the proposed action.

Two aspects of group behavior makes the group's use of influence particularly feasible. First, it has been found that groups offer their members considerable social support [11,27]. This means that a group member is less likely to be agreeable to modifying the structure of his cognitive

goal set to accommodate a disagreeable proposed action. Second, Bem has found that group decisions tend to be more risky and daring than those of individuals [7].

Development of the Desired Criteria Based Upon the Group Legitimation Process Model

A summary of the previous discussion is useful as an aid in identifying the desired criteria. The primary legitimators in the American system are those legitimating groups who have established themselves over time. Typically, these groups can be characterized by the similarity of their members' cognitive sets, both goal sets and informational sets. Generally, it can be said that the lack of legitimacy of the proposed action relative to such a group as well as the resistance the action is expected to incur from such a group is a direct function of the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action and the common goal set of the legitimating group. It should be noted that there are many legitimating groups of this type and that each is capable of being an active legitimator on any proposed action.

Secondary legitimators are those groups which occasionally organize to represent the unorganized, general public. These groups can be characterized by several characteristics, including the difficulty that such groups encounter in attempting to organize, the ability of their

members to have dissimilar cognitive sets and still perform successfully as a legitimator on a particular proposed action, and the high likelihood that such a group will dissipate after the issue of the particular proposed action has dissipated. Lack of legitimacy of a proposed action relative to the general public and the resistance the action is expected to encounter from the general public is a direct function of all the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action as perceived by each individual and each individual's cognitive goal set. Two criteria follow directly from this summary:

1. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from any organized group is a direct function of the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action and the common goal set of the group.

2. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to encounter from newly-organized groups forming from the general public is a direct function of all the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action as perceived by each individual and each individual's cognitive goal set. The functional relationship is not nearly as strong as that of the first criteria.

It has been assumed that individuals and groups have access to complete information concerning the possible consequences of the proposed action in order to make a

rational decision concerning its legitimacy. Wengert suggests that in the absence of certain information, the legitimation process becomes dependent upon socialization and upon tolerance and confidence in the equity of the planning process [56]. This can be explained in the context of cognitive dissonance theory. Consider an individual, group member or not. He receives an informational input of the possible consequences of the proposed action from which he establishes a cognitive information set. Assume that the individual considers one or more elements of his cognitive goal set to be very important and that he suspects that the proposed action is related to at least one of these elements, but that these relationships are not included in the cognitive information set. If, after attempting to collect more information, he is unsuccessful, he is left with several alternatives. He may either approve the proposed action and place his faith in the ability and equity of the government or he may attempt to delay the proposed action until more comprehensive and relevant information is provided. There is little doubt that tolerance and confidence in the equity of government is presently at a low level [28,35,51]. Therefore, two additional criteria can be added to the two previously presented:

3. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from any organized group is a direct function of the lack of information concerning possible consequences of

the action relating to important elements of the group's common goal set.

4. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from newly-organized groups forming from the general public is a direct function of a lack of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed action relating to important elements of each individual's cognitive goal set. Again, the functional relationship is not nearly as strong as that of criterion [3].

One additional aspect of legitimation remains to be considered, that of the time element. From the model of the legitimation system, it can be postulated that as long as information concerning the proposed action is input into the legitimation system, the legitimation process will function. This means that the legitimation process begins when the first element of information concerning the proposed action reaches an individual, continues throughout the life of the action, and ends only when the action is discontinued.

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CPS

The purpose of Chapter IV is to analyze the CPS formulated in Chapter II in an attempt to estimate the resistance to the implementation of a proposed plan. The analysis is based upon the four implementation resistance estimating criteria presented in Chapter III. They include:

1. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from any organized group is a direct function of the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action and the common goal set of the group.

2. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to encounter from newly-organized groups forming from the general public is a direct function of all the discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action as perceived by each individual and each individual's cognitive goal set. This functional relationship is not nearly as strong as that of the first criteria.

3. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from any organized group is a direct function of the lack of information concerning possible consequences of the action relating to important elements of the group's

common goal set.

4. The resistance that a plan of action is expected to incur from newly-organized groups forming from the general public is a direct function of a lack of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed action relating to important elements of each individual's cognitive goal set. Again, the functional relationship is not nearly as strong as that of criterion [3].

The analysis follows a simple basic format. First, a criterion by which implementation resistance can be estimated is identified. Second, the aspects of the CPS which relate to this criterion are identified. Third, the performance of these aspects of the CPS are reviewed. Fourth, and finally, this performance is analyzed to determine if and under what circumstances the performance might lead to citizen resistance at implementation.

Analysis with Respect to Criteria Relating to Organized Groups

In Chapter III the primary legitimators in the legitimation model were identified as those groups which were organized and which had functioned as legitimators over a relatively long period of time. The resistance that a plan is expected to incur from such a group is a direct function of two criteria. The first is the set of discrepancies that exists between the possible consequences of the

proposed action and the common goal set of the group. The second is the lack of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed action which relate to important elements of the group's common goal set.

Analysis with Respect to the First Criterion

Two aspects of the CPS are related to the first criterion, Criterion 1, and are relevant to the analysis. The first is the ability of the CPS to estimate the common goal sets of all organized groups. The second is the effectiveness of the CPS in using this estimate to determine actions whose consequences are compatible with these common goal sets. The first aspect is directly concerned with the function of determining the desires of the governed. In this function the planner identifies all possible organized groups. Upon identifying a group, the planner educates the group as to the purpose and structure of objectives under which the planner operates. The planner then actively and continuously solicits objectives from the group. The group represents its common goal set as a comprehensive set of objectives, communicates this set to the planner, and updates the set when appropriate. Assuming that the participants perform as intended, one may conclude that a valid representation of the common goal sets of all organized groups exist. Then, there is a possibility that the CPS will purposely determine a plan of action which is compatible with these common goal sets. This implies the possibility

of no organized group resistance at implementation.

If the previous assumption does not hold, resistance is more probable. If the planner fails to identify, educate, and/or solicit objectives from a certain group the CPS objectives will not reflect that group's common goal set. Functioning oblivious to the common goal set of this group, the CPS cannot purposely determine a plan of action which is compatible with the group's common goal set. This suggests that implementation resistance from this group is possible, if not probable. If the group fails to relate its objectives to the planner or is not capable of effectively translating its common goal set into a comprehensive set of objectives, the CPS objectives will not accurately reflect that group's common goal set. Similar implementation resistance may be expected. In addition, the accuracy of the estimate of the common goal sets is highly dependent upon the continuous nature of the function. The common goal set of an organized group is not necessarily stationary and, thus, its estimation must be a dynamic process. More importantly, the fact that the CPS can only estimate this common goal set suggests that the accuracy of this estimate will improve over time. Only a dynamic process allows continuous convergence of the estimate.

The second aspect, the effectiveness of the CPS in using the current set of objectives to determine actions whose consequences are compatible with the common goal sets

of the organized groups, is directly concerned with the remainder of the CPS. In this aspect it is necessary to start by assuming that a set of objectives exist which accurately reflect the common goal sets of the organized groups. The planner measures or estimates the current values of the physical characteristics of the environment identified as important by the groups in terms of the criteria specified in the objective set. From each measurement an estimate is made of the deviation of the physical characteristic from its desired value. When criteria are non-objective, the planner uses group opinions as an aid in estimating both the current values and deviations. Groups communicate their opinions of the current values and deviations to the planner. The planner then formulates a wide variety of possible comprehensive governmental actions which address the current problem set. Formulation resources are allocated to problems on the basis of current deviations and the importance of the corresponding objectives. When problems exist with physical characteristics having non-objective criteria, the planner solicits aid in alternative formulation from the groups. The groups provide the aid. Planners disseminate all information concerning current objectives, current values and deviations of the corresponding physical characteristics, and proposed alternatives to the groups. The groups review the information and propose additional alternatives. The planner forecasts the

consequences of each alternative in terms of the physical characteristics and criteria specified in the current set of objectives. When criteria are non-objective, the planner uses the opinions of the organized groups as an aid in forecasting future environmental performance. The groups provide their opinions of the consequences of each alternative in terms of these criteria. The planner disseminates these forecasts along with all other information compiled by the CPS to the organized groups and the elected official. The groups review all the information, formulate their opinions, and communicate them to the elected official. The elected official uses the information from the CPS and the opinions from the organized groups to select an appropriate alternative or to determine that alternative modification is necessary.

The analysis of the performance of this aspect of the CPS can best be made in segments. First, if one may assume that the participants perform as intended through the function of problem identification, one can conclude that the problem set accurately reflects current environmental deviations from the common goal sets of the organized groups. This implies that there is a possibility that the CPS will be able to purposely determine a plan of action which corrects these deviations. Being capable of correcting the known deviations, the plan of action has the possibility of encountering little or no organized group resistance at

implementation. If the assumption does not hold, the problem set will not accurately reflect current environmental deviations from the group's common goal sets. This implies that the CPS cannot purposely determine a plan of action which corrects these deviations. This directly implies that the plan has a potential for organized group implementation resistance. For physical characteristics of the environment with objective criteria, a lack of accuracy would probably result from planner carelessness. For those with non-objective criteria, lack of accuracy may stem from several sources. If the planner fails to fully utilize the opinions of the organized groups in estimating the current values and deviations of these physical characteristics, inaccuracy is probable. Lack of accuracy may also occur if the groups do not honestly express their opinions to the planner.

Second, assuming that an accurate problem set exists and that the participants in the function of developing alternative actions perform as intended, one may conclude that a broad range of possible comprehensive governmental actions exist that address the current problem set. This suggests that the CPS still maintains the capability of determining a plan of action which corrects the known deviations and, thus, which may encounter only minimal implementation resistance from organized groups. When the assumption of intended performance does not hold, the

alternative set may be narrow and/or may not even address current problems. The narrow alternative set may be caused by a variety of factors. If the planner devotes the majority of his alternative formulation resources to only one plan or to only one class of plan, the resulting alternative set may well be narrow. If any alternative set developed by the planner is not augmented by additional alternatives from the organized groups, the resulting alternative set may be narrow. Reasons for not obtaining additional alternatives from the groups include failure of the planner to disseminate relevant information to the groups, failure of the planner to solicit or even accept additional alternatives from the groups, and failure of the groups to review the pertinent information and offer additional alternatives. The effect of a narrow alternative set is not direct. It must be remembered that the problem set is only an estimate of the actual deviations between the environment and the common goal sets of the groups. Naturally, the wider the alternative set, assuming alternatives are at the same level of complexity, the greater the possibility that an alternative actually addresses the true problem. A narrow alternative set may then be synonymous with an alternative set which does not accurately address the current problems. An alternative set that does not address the current problems may also result if the planner does not use the problem set and/or the importance indicators

in formulating alternatives. The result of a set of alternatives which do not address current problems will possibly be a plan of action which does not address these problems. Implementation resistance can then be expected.

Third, assuming that an alternative set exists which accurately addresses current problems and that the participants perform as intended up until, but not including, the function of selecting the final plan, one can conclude that the elected official has sufficient information to determine whether any alternative is compatible with the common goal sets of the organized groups or whether alternatives will need to be modified for compatibility. This suggests that the elected official may select a plan which is compatible with the common goal sets of the organized groups and the subsequent plan may encounter only minimal organized group resistance at implementation. If the intended performance cannot be assumed, the possibility of implementation resistance from organized groups increases. If the elected official receives inaccurate or incomplete opinions from the groups, he cannot purposely select a plan which is compatible with the common goal sets. An absence of a group's opinion may indicate inadequate information flow to that group; but, more likely, it indicates a lack of concern and possibly even a weakening of the group. Inaccurate group opinions may stem from a variety of sources. Inaccurate forecasts can easily result in

inaccurate group opinions. Planner failure to disseminate all information may have the same result. A group may contribute to the inaccuracy of its own opinion by failing to review all pertinent information before formulating an opinion.

Finally, assuming that the elected official has sufficient information to make a rational decision, the compatibility of the plan of action with the common goal sets of the organized groups depends upon the technical skill, political expertise, and general benevolence of the elected official. Assuming that the elected official is highly qualified in all respects and, more importantly, that overall organized group compatibility is possible, then one may conclude that the CPS will output the compatible plan and that the plan will encounter no significant organized group implementation resistance. Assuming that the former assumption holds, but that the latter does not, then one may conclude that the CPS will output a plan which is as near compatibility as possible. Of course, implementation resistance from organized groups is possible in this case. If the quality of the elected official is less than ideal, one may conclude that the final plan will be less compatible than need be and that additional implementation resistance will be encountered.

Analysis with Respect to the Third Criterion

The second criterion relating to organized groups is

the lack of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed action which relate to important elements of the common goal sets of organized groups. Two aspects of the CPS are related to this criterion and are relevant to the analysis. The first is the ability of the CPS to estimate the important elements in each organized group's common goal set. The second is the ability of the CPS to use this estimate to provide the necessary information to the groups. The first aspect is identical to that of the first criterion and, thus, the performance of the function of determining the desires of organized groups will not be reviewed. From the previous discussion it was concluded that if the participants in the function perform as intended, a valid representation of the respective common goal sets of all organized groups exist. This implies that the CPS also has an estimate of the important elements in each group's common goal set. This further implies that the CPS has the possibility of forecasting the consequences of the proposed action which relates to these elements and of disseminating the information to the group. Thus, there exists the possibility of little or no implementation resistance from organized groups from lack of information. If the assumption of intended performance fails to hold, the probability of implementation resistance from lack of information increases. In the discussion of the previous criterion, specific instances in which the CPS set of

objectives would not accurately represent the common goal sets of the organized groups were given and thus, will not be reiterated. The result of the CPS set of objectives not accurately representing the common goal sets of the organized groups is that the CPS cannot purposely forecast the consequences of the proposed action which relate to the important elements in these common goal sets and, thus, the CPS cannot disseminate the information to the groups. This implies that implementation resistance is possible due to the lack of information.

The second aspect, that of the ability of the CPS to use the current set of objectives to provide the necessary information to the organized groups, is concerned with the functions of forecasting and information dissemination. In the functions of forecasting the consequences of alternative governmental actions, the planner forecasts the consequences of each alternative governmental action in terms of the physical characteristics and criterion specified in the current set of objectives. When certain criteria are non-objective, the planner uses the opinions of the organized groups as an aid in forecasting. The organized groups provide these opinions. The planner disseminates all forecasted consequences of each alternative to the groups prior to the final decision. Assuming that the CPS set of objectives accurately represents the important elements of the common goal sets of the organized groups and that the

participants in the function perform as intended, one can conclude that the CPS provides the groups with all pertinent information and that implementation resistance due to lack of information will be minimized. If the planner fails to forecast the consequences of each alternative in terms of the physical characteristics and criterion specified in the current set of objectives, he cannot disseminate the information to the groups, and the probability of implementation resistance increases. Likewise, if the groups fail to aid in the forecasting efforts and the planner cannot realistically forecast the consequences in terms of a particular non-objective criteria, the information will not be available for dissemination.

Summary

To summarize the discussion of the first two criteria, the CPS has the potential to purposely determine a plan of action which encounters only minimal implementation resistance from organized groups. The actual ability of a particular CPS to obtain these results relies heavily on the performance of the participants: the planner, the organized groups, and the elected official.

Analysis with Respect to Criteria Relating to the General Public

Chapter III identified secondary legitimators in the legitimation model as those groups of the unorganized,

general public who organize specifically to resist a particular plan of action. The resistance that a plan is expected to incur from such a group is a direct function of two criteria which are very similar to the criteria relating to organized groups. The first is the set of discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action as perceived by each individual and each individual's cognitive goal set. The second is the lack of information concerning the possible consequences of the proposed action which relate to important elements in each individual's cognitive goal set.

Analysis with Respect to the Second Criterion

Two aspects of the CPS are related to the first criterion relating to the general public, criterion 2. The first is the ability of the CPS to estimate each individual's cognitive goal set. The second is the effectiveness of the CPS in using this estimate to determine actions whose consequences are compatible with these cognitive goal sets. The first aspect is directly concerned with the function of determining the desires of the governed. In this function the planner hypothetically groups various individuals in the general public on the basis of a common characteristic(s) such as geographical residence, socio-economic group, cultural group, occupation, age, or sex. Such a group is called a hypothetical group. Where physically possible the planner encourages at least a minimal organization of a

hypothetical group. Once a hypothetical group is identified and, hopefully, minimally organized, the performance of this function with respect to the hypothetical group is identical to that with respect to an organized group.

It should be clear that the CPS does not, nor does it intend to, directly estimate each individual's cognitive goal set. Instead, the CPS attempts to identify those subsets of the general public with potential for organization, estimates their hypothetical common goal sets, and uses this estimate for planning purposes.

Assuming that the participants in this function perform as intended, one can conclude that certain potential legitimating groups from the general public have been identified and that the CPS set of objectives adequately represents their respective hypothetical common goal sets. This implies that the CPS can determine a plan of action which is compatible with these common goal sets. While this also implies that there may be little or no implementation resistance from the hypothetical groups identified, it in no way implies that segments of the general public other than those having the similar characteristics mentioned above cannot organize to resist plan implementation. Thus, the inability of the CPS to estimate the cognitive goal set of each individual allows the possibility of implementation resistance from subsets of the general public not identified as hypothetical groups. While the

possibility of this type of implementation resistance exists, the physical realities of group organization suggest that the probability of group organization when the group lacks such common characteristics as geographical location, occupation, socio-economic background, or cultural background is relatively small when compared to that of a group sharing one or more common characteristics. Thus, identification of obvious potential legitimating groups significantly lowers the probability of implementation resistance from the general public.

If the assumption of intended performance fails to hold, the same factors which led to an increased probability of implementation resistance from organized groups may lead to an increase in resistance from hypothetical groups. The only significant difference between the two analyses is in the magnitude of the expected increase. As one may remember, the expected result of a CPS objective set inaccuracy in estimating the common goal set of an organized group was a high probability of implementation resistance from that group. In contrast, a similar inaccuracy with respect to a hypothetical group may well result in little or no implementation resistance. This conclusion is justified from the fact that the hypothetical group has only a minimal organization, if any, and from the possibility that the group is not seriously committed to its common goal set.

The second aspect, the effectiveness of the CPS in

using the current set of objectives to determine actions whose consequences are compatible with the individual's cognitive goal sets, is directly concerned with the remainder of the CPS. The performance of this aspect with respect to hypothetical groups is identical to that with respect to organized groups, and the analyses are identical except for the magnitudinal difference noted in the previous analysis.

Analysis with Respect to the Fourth Criterion

The second criterion relating to the general public, the lack of information concerning the possible consequences of the proposed action which relates to important elements in each individual's cognitive goal set, is related to two aspects of the CPS. The first aspect is the ability of the CPS to estimate the important elements in each individual's cognitive goal set. The second is the ability of the CPS to use this estimate to provide the necessary information to the individuals. The first aspect is directly concerned with the function of determining the desires of the governed. The performance of this function with respect to the general public was reviewed in the analysis of the previous criterion, and it will not be reiterated. As noted in that analysis, the CPS does not intend to estimate the important elements in each individual's cognitive goal set. Instead, it attempts to estimate the important elements in the hypothetical common goal sets of potential legitimating groups.

Assuming that the participants perform as intended, the same conclusions drawn for the organized groups may also be drawn for the hypothetical groups. Once again, however, the inability of the CPS to estimate the important elements in each individual's cognitive goal set results in the possibility of implementation resistance from subsets of the general public not recognized as potential legitimators. If the assumption of intended performance fails to hold, the analysis of this aspect with respect to hypothetical groups is very similar to that with respect to organized groups with the only significant difference being the magnitudinal difference noted previously.

The second aspect, that of the ability of the CPS to use the current set of objectives to provide the necessary information to the individuals, is concerned with the functions of forecasting and information dissemination. The aspect's performance and analysis with respect to hypothetical groups is very similar to the corresponding discussion with respect to the organized groups with the sole exception being the magnitudinal difference noted previously.

Summary

To summarize the discussion of the second two criteria, the CPS does not attempt to deal with the general public at the individual level. Instead, it hypothetically groups the general public by certain classes of common

characteristics and considers each a potential legitimating group. The result of the CPS inability to work at the individual level poses the risk of arbitrary group formations from the general public to resist a planned action. The probability of an arbitrary group's formation is small, however, when compared to that of a group with certain common characteristics. Thus, the CPS has the potential to purposely determine a plan of action which encounters a practical minimum of implementation resistance from the general public. As before, the actual ability of a particular CPS to obtain these results relies on the performance of the participants: the planner, the hypothetical groups, and the elected official. However, the performance of the participants is not nearly as critical in reducing implementation resistance from hypothetical groups as it is in reducing that from organized groups.

CHAPTER V

AN EXAMPLE

The purpose of Chapter V is to establish an initial degree of validity for the criteria developed in Chapter III and for the analysis of the CPS in Chapter IV. While the conceptual nature of the criteria, the models, and the analysis make their absolute validation difficult, if not impossible, the analysis of a real world planning example to determine its conformity with these concepts should suggest their validity. More specifically, this chapter first identifies a public sector plan of action which encountered resistance at implementation. Data in terms of documented evidence are presented to aid in identifying the characteristics of the plan which led to resistance at implementation. After being identified in specific terms, these characteristics are stated in more generalized conceptual terms and compared to the criteria developed in Chapter III. The planning process which conceived the public sector plan is then identified and described historically. Finally, this process is analyzed with respect to the characteristics identified above in an attempt to identify those aspects of the process which contributed to the plan's rejection and to determine the

relationships involved.

An Actual Public Sector Plan and its Analysis

The public sector plan of action is a plan to construct a 1.08 mile segment of a proposed Stone Mountain Freeway in Atlanta, Georgia. The exact location of the segment is shown in Figure 4 below. The segment was to begin at a point near Candler Park south of Fairview Road, proceed east along the south side of Ponce de Leon Avenue, cut through the middle of Deep Dene Park, and end at an interchange to be constructed south of Fernbank Science Center near the Seaboard Railroad tracks at Artwood Road. As suggested earlier an attempt to implement the plan ended in abject failure when it encountered strong resistance from local elected officials. In particular, the Dekalb County Democratic Executive Committee, the Fourth District United States Congressman, the Dekalb County grand jury, the Dekalb County state legislative delegation, and the Decatur City Commission opposed the plan and actively worked for its rejection. To determine the characteristics of the plan which led to its rejection, it is necessary to determine the elected officials' motivation in opposing the plan. A review of newspaper clippings of the era reveals that for the first nine months following the presentation of the plan to the general public, the elected officials neither accepted nor rejected the plan. Then, in a period



Figure 4. Location of Planned Freeway Segment

of less than thirty days all elected officials voiced bitter criticism of the plan. Furthermore, the clippings reveal that immediately preceding this period the Druid Hills Civic Association sponsored a protest meeting to organize the citizens of the community into an effective opposition force. Methods of operation suggested at the meeting included a letter writing campaign to local elected officials. In light of history, there is little doubt that the Druid Hills Civic Association's opposition to the plan was instrumental in motivating its rejection by local elected officials.

Two other groups had significant roles in opposing the plan. The Dekalb County Board of Education and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation of the United States Department of the Interior both presented vocal arguments opposing the plan at its public hearing. While there is little evidence to show that the Dekalb County Board of Education officially encouraged local elected officials to reject the plan, there is little doubt that it actively supported the Druid Hills Civic Association's efforts [44]. The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation took a more active role in opposing the plan. Bureau correspondence reveals that the Bureau actively encouraged the Druid Hills Civic Association in its efforts and continuously and publicly questioned the Georgia State Highway Department's ethics in developing the plan [58].

Having concluded that the opposition of the Druid Hills Civic Association coupled with the support and advice of the Dekalb County Board of Education and the Bureau of

Outdoor Recreation was the primary motivation of the local elected officials' rejection of the plan, one must still determine the factors that motivated these groups to oppose the plan. The specific reasons for the groups' opposition to the plan are stated in the transcripts of the plan's public hearing which was held on October 3, 1968 [24]. The Dekalb County Board of Education opposed the plan for several reasons. First, they stated that freeway construction and operation would hamper operations at the Fernbank Science Center Astronomical Observatory. Experts from the observatory stated that dust and fumes from traffic coupled with the freeway lighting would obscure large portions of the night sky and that vibrations from traffic would blur the telescopic images. Second, they stated that freeway construction and operation would hamper operations at Fernbank Elementary School. The school's principal stated that the expressway would usurp a portion of the school's campus and that noise and vibrations would be disruptive to normal classroom functioning. The United States Department of the Interior opposed construction of the freeway because it would totally destroy several parks and acres of virgin forest. The Regional Director of Outdoor Planning for the agency stated that the destruction of Deep Dene Park, Shady Side Park, and a portion of Fernbank Forest would be disruptive to public recreation. The Druid Hills Civic Association and hundreds of residents of the Druid

Hills community opposed the freeway for more personal reasons. The president of the Association stated that construction of the freeway would cut through the very heart of one of the most active and beautiful communities in the country. Emphasizing the fact that Druid Hills had been chosen by Holiday Magazine as one of the ten most desirable places to live in the United States, he stated that the freeway would destroy many beautiful homes, deteriorate the community, and, possibly, lead to its ultimate collapse.

Prior to stating these specific characteristics in a more generalized conceptual form, it is beneficial to examine the reason for each opposing group's existence. The purpose of the Dekalb County Board of Education is to provide a quality education to each child in the county [44]. The purpose of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation is to promote and coordinate Federal recreational programs and to preserve, protect and enhance recreational parks and places of natural beauty [63]. The purpose of the Druid Hills Civic Association is to enhance and preserve the community of Druid Hills [48]. Each group opposed the plan's implementation because it recognized that the implementation would definitely result in some consequences and could directly conflict with its most important goal, its reason for existence.

It should be noted that these facts directly support

the theory proposed in Chapter III that the primary legitimators in the legitimation process are those previously organized groups who have established themselves over time. It should also be noted that the generalized characteristic above directly supports the first criterion developed in Chapter III. This is particularly interesting since the conclusions of Chapter III were the result of a theoretical model of the legitimation process, while the results of this chapter were developed from an actual rejected public sector plan. It should further be noted that the remaining criteria of Chapter III, 2, 3, and 4, are not readily applicable to the example case. With respect to Criteria 2 and 4, the groups and individuals involved did not lack relevant information. In fact, they had more than enough information on which to base a justification decision. With respect to Criterion 3, the individuals involved, the residents of the Druid Hills community, had no reason to form an organized group, since they were already well represented by the Druid Hills Civic Association.

The Planning Process Which Conceived the Public Sector Plan and Its Analysis

The planning process which conceived this plan is essentially the same process which was responsible for all highway construction plans in the Atlanta area in the 1940's, 50's, and 60's. For consistency, this process is

described in terms of the key elements identified in Chapter II.

The environment of the planning process was the metropolitan Atlanta area of the 1940's, 50's, and 60's. Atlanta is the transportation hub of the southeastern United States. It is the business center of the region. With transportation and business came people, and Atlanta became one of the fastest growing urban areas in the United States. This massive influx of people resulted in rapid suburban expansion into the surrounding counties. While the population tended to decentralize further and further into the countryside, the vast majority of employment opportunities remained in Atlanta's central business district (CBD). The natural consequence of rapid population growth, outward suburban decentralization, employment concentration in the CBD, and reliance on the automobile to bridge this increasing gap was a rapid saturation of existing automobile facilities, particularly during rush hours. This inevitably led to increasing traffic congestion and delay.

The purpose of the highway planning process is explicit and well documented: to plan a system of freeways which would relieve traffic congestion and permit traffic to move freely, speedily, and with fewer stops in and near Atlanta [15,22,23,39,41,43]. There appears to be three primary reasons for the process's adoption of such a

purpose. First, the primary participant in the process was the State Highway Department of Georgia. This agency viewed traffic congestion as detrimental since it resulted in wasted driver time, wasted gasoline, increased automobile repair costs, and irritation and fatigue for auto occupants [22]. Naturally, being a highway agency, it advocated highways as the solution. Second, the Federal Bureau of Public Roads was advocating alleviation of traffic congestion around major cities through highway planning and construction. Third, and probably the most important, the elected officials of the era and the majority of those in positions of influence were businessmen firmly committed to the unlimited growth of Atlanta's CBD. Advocating an excess of freeway capacity to encourage even faster growth of the CBD, these men naturally viewed traffic congestion as a real threat to the economic growth of the CBD, the region, and themselves [15,39,41,43].

The functions which comprised the process and the participants who performed the functions can best be described simultaneously. The planning process consisted of two distinct phases. The first phase can be called the comprehensive planning phase. The result of the comprehensive planning phase was a plan which described the general location of all future freeways which were needed in the Atlanta area. The second phase can be called the detailed location and design phase. The result of this phase was a

plan from which a freeway or segment would actually be constructed. The plan for the controversial 1.08 mile segment which was presented to the public in the public hearing on October 3, 1968, was such a plan. Serving as a link between these two phases was a queueing and funding process which determined the sequential order of detailed location and design planning and construction of the various freeways and segments specified in the comprehensive plan [13,40].

The Comprehensive phase of the planning process can best be described in terms of its history. The process began in the early 1940's when the Georgia State Highway Department commissioned H. W. Lochner and Company to formulate an expressway plan for the Atlanta area. The result of the Lochner and Company work, the Lochner Study, was published in 1946 [34]. The Lochner Study included a recommended expressway plan for the Atlanta area and documentation of the process by which this plan was formulated. Lochner cited its major consideration in formulating the expressway plan as being the probable maximum traffic which would be simultaneously using a given proposed freeway segment over its useful life. Two factors were considered relevant to this maximum traffic volume determination: the number and distribution of people within the Atlanta area and the type and amount of transportation they demand. Planning around the year 1970,

Lochner estimated the future population of the Atlanta area by reviewing population trends between 1930 and 1940 and extrapolating these trends to 1970. Population distribution was estimated by reviewing building permits issued between 1939 and 1941. Using the current distribution and the identified trends, the future distribution was estimated. The amount and type of transportation that would be demanded in 1970 was estimated by studying pre-war vehicle registration records, extrapolating the noticeable trends into the future using estimates of future population size, and increasing this estimate in consideration of an expected increase in automobile usage resulting from improved vehicles and freeways. Having an estimate of future population size, distribution, and transportation desires, Lochner estimated future routes along which this future population would desire to move using origin-destination data collected by the Georgia Highway Department in 1940-1941 and 1944-1945. The latter survey hypothetically reached one out of every ten households in the Atlanta area and determined what trips were made by each member of the family on a representiative day [22]. Integrating the traffic flows with projected population and distribution, Lochner arrived at an estimated 1970 traffic flow map. The map is shown in Figure 5. The map essentially shows the estimated number of vehicles that would move between various points of the city in 1970 if direct routes were available.



Figure 5. Lochner's Traffic Flow Map [34]

The map was then used to determine what new freeways were needed by 1970. First, the estimated traffic flows were assigned to existing traffic facilities. Then, excess flows were estimated and freeways were proposed to handle these flows. Consideration was also given to the factors of cost of right-of-way, topography, and need to stimulate or direct the development of new residential and industrial areas. Lochner's recommended expressway plan is shown in Figure 6 below. It should be noted that Lochner's proposed eastern freeway does not include the controversial segment of Stone Mountain Freeway. Although the Lochner study might then appear to be irrelevant to the planning process of the segment, it, in fact, was highly relevant for several reasons. First, the Lochner plan served as the basic skeleton of Atlanta's proposed freeway system, with future plans merely updating or "filling-out" the skeleton. This was largely a result of the immediate construction of several key portions of the Lochner Plan which tended to force the construction of the remaining portions. Second, the methodology used by Lochner and Company, called desire line planning, served as a model for the Georgia State Highway Department as it eventually updated the Lochner Plan to include the controversial segment.

In the six years following the publishing of the Lochner study, a scarcity of funds limited construction of the proposed plan to a few north-south segments that feed

the CBD. During this period, Fulton and Dekalb counties established the Metropolitan Planning Commission and charged it with the task of developing a master plan for the Atlanta area which would include a plan for needed expressways. In February, 1952, the Commission published a preliminary report, Up Ahead: A Regional Land Use Plan for Metropolitan Atlanta [39]. The purpose of Up Ahead relative to freeway planning was to identify obvious future trends in population, industry, and commerce and, on the basis of these trends, suggest possible modifications to the Lochner plan which could be more intensively studied by the Georgia State Highway Department. Estimating current trends using a broad data base and extrapolating these trends into the future, the Commission concluded that unincorporated areas to the north and south of Decatur would become the fastest growing in the entire metropolitan area. On the basis of these expansion trends, the Commission suggested the possible need for two expressways extending east from the CBD, in contrast to Lochner's single route. The Commission's suggested routes are shown in Figure 6. It should be noted that the controversial segment of the Stone Mountain Freeway was included in the northernmost route.

Mandated by law to study the Commission's suggestions, the Georgia State Highway Department initiated their study in 1951 [23]. The process used by the Department was essentially that used by Lochner. The major consideration



Figure 6. Freeway Plans Proposed by Lochner and Metropolitan Planning Commission [39]
Lochner Route — — MPC Route ———

in determining desire lines was that of maximum expected traffic volume during the design peak hours. Planning for the year 1980, the Department used estimates of population and its distribution, industry, and business which were previously prepared by the Commission. To determine traffic routing, present weekday peak hour movements entering and leaving the CBD were determined via a postcard survey. From these data a 1980 traffic flow map was prepared, traffic was assigned to existing routes, and estimates of future needs were prepared. The result of the study was the conclusion that no single route to the east would be capable of handling excess traffic flow in 1980. As a result, the Department recommended the two eastern routes suggested by the Commission.

The updated freeway plan was presented to local elected officials and then to the general public in a public hearing in June, 1952. No significant opposition to the routes was encountered, and the Commission formally adopted the plan. This updated freeway plan, which included the controversial segment, appeared in two formal comprehensive plans published in 1954: The Municipal Planning Board's Major Thoroughfare Plan for the City of Atlanta and Fulton County [43] and the Metropolitan Planning Commission's Now-For Tomorrow: A Master Planning Program for the Dekalb-Fulton Metropolitan Area [40]. Upon acceptance by the Commission, the segment was programmed and placed on the

primary federal-aid system in 1956. This guaranteed 50 percent federal funding in financing construction of the segment. Construction of the segment now awaited only the availability of state funds and detailed location and design planning efforts. Follow-up freeway plans published in 1959 [41] and 1962 [5] by the Commission accepted the programmed segment as given.

Proceeding under a policy of segmental planning and construction, the Georgia State Highway Department presented detailed location and design plans for the far eastern and far western segments of Stone Mountain Freeway at public hearings held in 1960 and 1961, respectively. Included in the presentation was the general location of the interior segments which included the controversial segment. Although questioned by the Druid Hills Civic Association concerning the specific location of the interior segments, the Highway Department consistently maintained the position that unplanned segments were not relevant topics of discussion [16]. With no significant opposition, the two end segments of Stone Mountain Freeway were approved, and the Highway Department proceeded to construct the eastern segment and acquire land for the western segment. In 1966, having completed much of the construction of the eastern segment and having acquired most of the land for the western segment, the Highway Department began detailed location and design planning of the controversial segment. To locate this

segment, the Highway Department's urban planner took several factors into account [26]. First, the two endpoints were determined. The western endpoint was of course determined by land previously acquired for the adjoining segment, while the eastern endpoint was located so as to provide an interchange at the intersection of Ponce de Leon Avenue and Scott Boulevard. Given these two endpoints, the urban designer's problem was reduced to connecting the endpoints using a route which minimized community disruption while still considering cost of right-of-way, topography, soil composition, and cut-and-fill requirements. To accomplish this, the urban designer used aerial photographs of the area between these two endpoints and located the route so as to destroy a minimum number of homes. The result of initially fixing the eastern endpoint, however, was the certain location of the segment in the center of the Druid Hills community, the certain destruction of acres of parkland, and the certain placement of the adjoining eastern segment very near Fernbank Elementary School and Fernbank Science Center. Upon discovering the intention of the Highway Department, the Druid Hills Civic Association argued continuously for the relocation of the segment, but the prevailing Highway Department policy was to ignore private groups or individuals and work only with governmental officials [13]. Before presenting the plan in a public hearing the Highway Department secured the approval of the

Dekalb County Highway Engineer and the county Chief of Parks [49]. The plan was presented in a public hearing on October 3, 1968, 16 years after it had first been proposed.

The analysis of the planning process is devoted solely to determining what particular aspects of the process led to the plan's eventual rejection. Earlier in the chapter, it was concluded that the plan was rejected because of the opposition of three groups. It was also concluded that each group opposed the plan because it recognized that plan implementation would definitely result in severely adverse consequences which would directly conflict with its most important goals. Three aspects of the planning process are then relevant to the analysis: the manner in which the process determined the important goals of the opposing groups, the manner in which these goals were used in the planning process, and the manner in which the process provided information to the groups concerning consequences of plan implementation relating to these goals.

The comprehensive phase of the planning process used a transportation planning methodology known as desire-line planning. Reviewing the history of the comprehensive phase, one notes that the comprehensive planners used this technique iteratively to update the current freeway plan at regular intervals. It is readily apparent that the planners involved in each iteration did not explicitly determine the important goals of the opposing groups, except for perhaps

the business community. The reason for this is quite simple; the desire-line methodology did not require goal determination. Thus, other than for a possible intuitive recognition, the comprehensive planners made no recognition of the important goals of the three opposing groups. With no recognition of these goals, the planners planned exclusively to achieve their original stated purpose: to provide general locations for all freeways needed to alleviate traffic congestion in the Atlanta area. The result was a sequence of freeway plans which allowed and even encouraged the detailed location and design planners to place a freeway where it would directly conflict with the important goals of the three opposing groups. While at the end of each iteration the resulting plan was reviewed by local officials and presented to the general public in formal public hearings, there is no evidence that these devices either brought the groups' goals to the attention of the planners or would have resulted in plan modification if they had.

Just as it is clear that the comprehensive planners did not know the important goals of the three opposing groups, the State Highway Department and its urban designer knew exactly the goals of the three groups, especially as they pertained to the controversial segment of Stone Mountain Freeway. At the first detailed location and design public hearing held for a segment of the freeway, the

Druid Hills Civic Association expressed their concerns about the controversial segment. Thus, it can logically be concluded that the Highway Department could have located the freeway so as to be at least partially non-conflicting with the opposing groups' goals. Instead, the strategy used by the Highway Department, knowing the important goals of the opposing groups, was to acquire right-of-way land and then to construct the segment lying to the east of the controversial segment. At the same time, it approved and acquired all the land needed for the segment adjoining the controversial segment to the west. Then, after boxing the controversial segment in and leaving no other possible alternatives available, it presented its detailed location and design plan which placed the controversial segment exactly where it would conflict with the important goals of the three opposing groups. Thus, it appears that although the State Highway Department had determined and recognized these important goals, its use of the goals did little to improve the plan's compatibility with them. In fact, as a Division of Federal Coordination memorandum documents, the State Highway Department appeared to have used these goals to develop a strategy which would ultimately result in the implementation of a plan which would directly conflict with these goals [21].

The rejection of the plan to construct the controversial segment of Stone Mountain Freeway can then be linked

to two specific aspects of the planning process. First, the neglect of the important goals of the three opposing groups in the comprehensive planning phase resulted in a general location plan which allowed and even encouraged the detailed location and design planners of the State Highway Department to place the controversial segment where it would directly conflict with these important goals. Second, the non-cooperative and possibly malevolent manner in which the State Highway Department planned the detailed location and design phase to overpower these goals and place the controversial segment exactly where it was desired by the Department resulted in fierce opposition from the three opposing groups.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The primary focus of this research has been on the analysis of a specific conceptual public sector planning system to estimate the resistance to implementation of a plan proposed by the system. The analysis necessitated the synthesis of an appropriate planning system model and the development of a set of relevant criteria that relate the performance of the planning system to expected resistance to plan implementation. Conclusions reached in the research include:

(1) The lack of legitimacy of a plan relative to an organized group as well as resistance to the plan by the group is expected to occur as a direct function of two factors:

(a) The discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed plan and the common goal set of the group.

(b) An absence of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed plan which relate to important elements of the group's common goal set.

(2) The lack of legitimacy of a plan relative to the general public as well as the resistance it can be

expected to encounter from some potential organized group in the general public is a direct function of two factors:

(a) All discrepancies that exist between the possible consequences of the proposed action as perceived by each individual and each individual's cognitive goal set.

(b) An absence of information concerning possible consequences of the proposed action relative to important elements of each individual's cognitive goal set.

(3) The probability of effective plan resistance from an organized group is much greater than that from the general public.

(4) The CPS has the potential to support development of a plan which encounters only minimal resistance from organized groups and the general public.

(5) The actual ability of the CPS to obtain these results is heavily dependent upon the performance of its participants: the planner, the citizens, and the elected official.

(6) Previous freeway planning performance in the Atlanta area leaves much to be desired. This planning effort has largely ignored the common goal sets of organized groups with occasionally disastrous results.

In the course of this research several important questions were encountered and not answered. These include:

(1) Is there now or has there ever been a planning system comparable to the CPS? If so, how does actual

performance compare with potential performance? Are the causes of the discrepancy human or technical?

(2) Is there any basis for determining the potential effectiveness of a hypothetical planning system? Do idealistic conceptualizations of planning systems hold any similarities to their real world counterparts? Does the human element normalize all planning systems?

(3) How has the introduction of the Georgia Action Plan actually affected the operations of the Georgia Department of Transportation? Is the planning process described in the Action Plan a fitting representation of the actual process? What are the discrepancies? What are the causes of the discrepancies?

(4) How common is the strategy of "boxing-in" a recalcitrant community to force it to accept an unpopular planning decision? (This might include such freeway examples as Memphis, San Antonio, and Atlanta.) How do the freeway examples relate to Section 4(f) of the DOT Enabling Act of 1966? Are there many instances of this outside of freeway planning.

(5) Is there any effective motivation for citizen organization for planning purposes other then immediate crises?

The research effort is concluded with a final observation. While existing institutions will probably not allow the current public sector planning process to change

appreciably in the short term, the increasing trend in citizen resistance to implementation efforts will almost certainly result in a long term evolution of the planning process. Random, unthinking, and incremental changes in the planning process in response to the rising and falling tide of public dissatisfaction will not necessarily result in a planning system superior to that in use today. Thoughtful consideration and analysis with respect to what the process is and what it is desired to be, then, should be a prerequisite for planning system modification. The findings of this research effort may very well serve as an integral component of such an analysis.

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